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[Votes Required for Enactment of Legislation]
[50.5% of the voters in the August 27, 2002, referendum voted
in favor of this amendment. A 75% affirmative vote was required to pass
the amendment, so the amendment failed.]
13. Committee Proposal No. 01-25:
This proposed amendment will amend Sections 8 and 20 of the
Constitution to alter the number of votes required to pass a bill on first and
second reading in the Congress. This proposal will require a simple majority
(8 votes) of all members to pass a bill on first reading and 2/3 (10 votes) of
the entire membership to pass it on second reading. Currently, it takes at
least 2/3 (10 votes) of all members of Congress to pass a bill on first
reading and 3 votes (each state casting one vote) of the four state
delegations to pass it on second reading.
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ANALYSIS:
This proposal reduces the votes required to pass a bill on first
reading from 10 to 8 and change the voting pattern on second reading from 3
votes of four state delegation to 10 votes of the entire membership. It removes
the state delegation vote on second reading; thus, the current constitutional
protection for the smaller states is discarded completely.
This proposal will render the smaller states totally irrelevant
in the Congress. For instance, Chuuk delegation, which has six members, will
need only two votes to pass a bill on first reading. On second reading, Chuuk
and Pohnpei delegations, with total members of 10, will be able to pass a bill.
Even if the 4 members from Kosrae and Yap object, they will be powerless to
prevent the passage of a bill on first and second readings.
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Under the current provision, Chuuk and Pohnpei delegations may
pass a bill on first reading but Kosrae and Yap delegations may defeat it on
second reading. This present situation forces the four state delegations to work
closely in passing legislation. Removing the protection of the smaller states
might render them nonessential in enacting legislation.
The voters in this country need to consider very carefully the
impact of this proposal on the smaller states’ participation in Congress and
decide whether now is the right time to forgo the current protection accorded to
the smaller states in the FSM Constitution. The current constitutional
protection accorded to the smaller states allays their fear of being ignored,
tramped upon, and shoved aside in the FSM Congress. In other words, it makes the
federation politically attractive to the smaller states. This protection played
a crucial role in convincing voters in the smaller states to ratify the FSM
Constitution.
© John R. Haglelgam, March 4, 2002
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